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CHRISTIAN FAITH 
WITHOUT BELIEF THAT GOD EXISTS: 
A DEFENSE OF POJMAN'S CONCEPTION OF FAITH 
Kenneth Einar Himma 
In a recent essay, Alexander R. Pruss argues that most Pojmanian Christians 
fall short of being fully Christian because they are morally committed to acts 
that are inconsistent with what they believe is required by Christian ethics. 
I argue that Pruss's argument falls short in a couple of important respects. 
First, I argue that Pruss significantly overstates the likelihood in a Pojmanian 
Christian of a conflict between her ethical precepts and what she thinks are 
Christian ethical precepts. Second, I argue that the argument relies on an im-
plausible statement of a putative moral principle. 
In his important article "Faith without Belief," Louis Pojman argues that 
propositional belief that God exists is not a necessary condition for faith/ 
belief in God. On this view, authentic Christian faith can be grounded in a 
"profound hope" that Christianity is true together with a passionate com-
mitment to act as if Christianity is true: 
If belief-in, or trusting, can be analyzed in terms of commitment to a 
course of action or a disposition to act, then it seems that we do not 
need to believe-that x exists in order to believe-in or deeply hope 
in the existence of x. We can live in profound hope, trusting in the 
object of hope. In ordinary hope we may not act according to the 
proposition in question, but may hedge our bet. ... But in profound 
hope ... the desire for the object is so great that the subject is ready 
to act even in the light of very little evidence or subjective probability 
that the object in question will be realized. In such hope enormous 
risk is warranted by the strength of the desire and the felt need. The 
person lives as if the proposition were true or becomes SO.1 
Thus, according to Pojman, someone who assigns an epistemic probability 
of less than .50 to the central tenets of Christianity can nonetheless instan-
tiate an authentic Christian faith and thereby receive all "essential benefits 
of religion," including eternal salvation. 
In a recent essay appearing in this journal, Alexander R. Pruss argues 
that what I will call Pojmanian faith is rarely, if ever, sufficient for being 
fully Christian.2 On Pruss's view, a Pojmanian Christian is very likely to 
find herself morally committed to acting in ways inconsistent with what 
she believes is required by Christian ethics. Since one cannot be fully 
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Christian without being committed to always doing what one believes is 
required by Christian ethics, Pojmanian Christians are unlikely to be fully 
Christian. If it is also true that being fully Christian is necessary for salva-
tion, then it also follows that Pojmanian faith rarely achieves salvation.3 
In this essay, I argue that Pruss's argument falls short in a couple of im-
portant respects. First, I argue that Pruss significantly overstates the likeli-
hood in a Pojmanian Christian of a conflict between her ethical precepts 
and what she thinks are Christian ethical precepts. Second, I argue that the 
argument relies on an implausible statement of a putative moral principle. 
I. Pruss's Criticism of the Pojmanian Conception 
Pruss's argument begins with what I will call the "Fully Christian Thesis" 
or FCT for short. According to FCT, one cannot be fully Christian. without 
being committed "to do[ing] everything that Christianity says is obliga-
tory and to refrain[ing] from everything that Christianity says is wrong" 
(CFB 292). This, of course, does not mean that one cannot be fully Chris-
tian if one continues to sin; no merely human being, according to main-
stream Christian theology, is capable of living a sinless life. What it does 
mean is that genuine Christian faith requires a committed disposition to 
satisfy the Christian ideal: "To be a Christian," Pruss concludes, "involves 
being committed to being a morally perfect Christian" (CFB 302). 
Pruss argues that, in cases where two moral claims conflict,4 we have 
a moral obligation to do what we believe is required by the claim with 
the higher epistemic probability. As Pruss describes the Moral Conflict 
Principle: 
(MCP) If after sufficiently thorough investigation (i) one believes that 
one body, A, of moral claims implies that an action cp is impermissible 
and another body, B, implies that it is obligatory, and (ii) one believes 
that the moral weight assigned by A to the impermissibility of cp is at 
least as great as that which B assigns to the obligatoriness of cp, while 
(iii) no other body of moral claims is a serious contender in one's 
epistemic predicament and (iv) one takes A to be more probable than 
B, then (v) one is morally prohibited from cping (CFB 294-95). 
MCP is not just an epistemic principle that purports to identify the moral 
claim that is most likely to be true; on Pruss's conception, MCP is a moral 
principle that defines a "real, albeit subjective, moral obligation" to do 
what is required by what one believes is the most epistemically likely 
moral claim when two moral claims conflict. 
MCP poses a problem for Pojman's analysis of faith, on Pruss's view, be-
cause it is likely to bring many persons with Pojmanian faith into conflict 
with FCT. Given the depth and subtlety of the argument, I will let Pruss 
speak for himself here: 
I claim that for a very large number, perhaps a majority of reason-
able Christians, there is moral conflict between Christian ethics and 
non-Christian ethics, where by "Christian ethics" I mean the body of 
those normative beliefs that the reasonable Christian thinks are very 
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likely true if Christianity is true, and by "non-Christian ethics" the 
body of those normative beliefs that our reasonable Christian thinks 
are very likely if Christianity is false .... 
Now, given the MCp, [consider] the case of Christian who believes 
that if Christianity is true then cping in circumstances C is obliga-
tory, but that such cping is impermissible, with at least as great moral 
weight, if Christianity is false. If such a Christian, moreover, assigns 
a less than 50% epistemic probability to Christianity, then she must 
think that the negation of Christianity is more likely true, and hence 
by the MCP she is morally prohibited from cping in circumstances 
C. Now, a moral person is committed to acting in accordance with 
morality. Hence our Christian will be committed to refraining from 
cping in circumstances C. But since Christianity claims that there is 
an obligation to cp in circumstances C, it follows that such a person 
cannot be fully a Christian. (CFB 293, 295). 
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Though Pruss couches the beginning of his argument in terms of what 
someone who assigns an epistemic probability of greater than .50 to Chris-
tianity would believe, the argument should be understood in terms of 
what a reasonable person who assigns an epistemic probability of less than 
50 to Christianity would be. Insofar as the conclusion purports to estab-
liish-on the strength of MCP-that most Pojmanian Christians will find 
themselves committed to acting in ways that are inconsistent with what 
they believe Christianity requires, the relevant beliefs have to be those that 
a Pojmanian Christian is likely to have. As is readily evident, we can infer 
a claim about what Pojmanian Christians are likely committed to doing 
via MCP only from a claim about what Pojmanian Christians are likely to 
believe. Strictly speaking, what someone who assigns an epistemic prob-
ability of greater than .50 to Christianity believes is not directly relevant. 
Thus construed, Pruss's argument is as follows. MCP obligates a per-
son to obey what she thinks is the most likely moral claim in the event of 
a conflict. But this means that someone who believes the probability that 
Christianity is true is less than .50 is obligated to act in accordance with 
non-Christian moral principles in the event they come into conflict with 
Christian moral principles. Accordingly, no matter how much such a per-
son might hope for the truth of Christianity, she is obligated to behave in a 
way that is inconsistent with being fully Christian. Since being fully Chris-
tian requires being committed to obeying morality and obeying moral-
ity requires acting in accordance with MCp, it follows that someone with 
merely Pojmanian faith cannot be fully committed to acting in accordance 
with Christian ethics and hence is not fully Christian under FCT. 
This is a problem for Pojman's view, according to Pruss, because "many, 
if not most," people who believe the epistemic probability of Christianity 
is less than .50 are committed to accepting moral beliefs that conflict with 
Christian ethical precepts. Pruss identifies five likely conflicts: (1) non-
Christian ethics implies it is sometimes obligatory to have an abortion, 
while Christian ethics implies it is always impermissible to have an abor-
tion; (2) non-Christian utilitarian ethics implies it is sometimes obligatory 
to execute an innocent person, while Christian ethics implies it is always 
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impermissible to execute an innocent person; (3) non-Christian ethics im-
plies it would be obligatory to offer sacrifice to Caesar if such is necessary 
to avoid having one's family tortured, while Christian ethics implies it is 
always impermissible to offer sacrifice to Caesar; (4) non-Christian ethics 
implies it is impermissible to go to Church when one's spouse has a mild 
illness, while Christian ethics implies it is obligatory in such circumstanc-
es to go to Church; and (5) non-Christian ethics implies it is sometimes 
obligatory to work on Sunday under circumstances of financial need that 
are insufficient, according to Christian ethics, to justify infringing Chris-
tianity's prima facie prohibition on working on Sunday. Thus, Pruss con-
cludes that "many, if not most," Pojmanian Christians are committed by 
MCP to acting in ways that prevent them from being fully Christian. 
II. What Christians and Non-Christians are Likely to Believe 
At the outset, it is worth noting that Pruss's conclusion is consistent with 
what Pojman is most concerned to establish in his arguments regarding 
faith. As Pruss describes the conclusion of his argument, "at least for peo-
ple in fairly common contemporary epistemic predicaments, being both 
fully a Christian and a moral person does require that one accept Chris-
tianity, or at least the existence of God, with an epistemic probability of 
at least 50%, thereby showing that mere Pojmanian hope, which does not 
require such an epistemic probability, is insufficient" (CFB 292; emphasis 
added). But Pojman never claimed that faith-as-hope is, by itself, a suf-
ficient condition for efficacious religious faith. As Pojman describes his 
project, "I shall develop a concept of faith as hope as an alternative to the 
usual notion that makes propositional belief that God exists a necessary 
condition for faith" (FWB 157-58, emphasis added). And Pojman's claim 
that propositional belief that God exists is not necessary for authentic reli-
gious faith is, of course, consistent with Pruss's claim that Pojmanian faith 
is not, by itself, sufficient for authentic religious faith. 
Accordingly, though Pruss takes himself to be challenging Pojman's 
view, the effect of the argument, if successful, is simply to articulate a new 
necessary constraint on Pojmanian faith. What the argument shows, at 
most, is that insofar as the ethical commitments of the Pojmanian Chris-
tian are at odds with what she believes are Christianity's ethical commit-
ments, she is committed to acting in ways that are not consistent with 
being fully Christian. But this implies only that someone with Pojmanian 
faith cannot be fully Christian unless her pre-existing ethical commitments 
are consistent with what she believes are Christianity's ethical commit-
ments; it does not imply that someone with Pojmanian faith cannot be 
fully Christian when her ethical commitments are consistent with what 
she believes are Christianity's ethical commitments. Thus, the argument 
might best be construed as showing that Pojman's view requires a signifi-
cant amendment-and not as showing it is false. If this is somewhat less 
than Pruss has in mind, it nonetheless represents an important contribu-
tion to the dialogue.5 
While Pruss realizes that Pojman's analysis is not intended to show that 
profound hope is a sufficient condition for authentic Christian faith, Pruss 
believes that his argument nonetheless poses a serious threat to Pojman's 
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view because "many, if not most," people with merely Pojmanian faith 
will find themselves committed to acting in ways inconsistent with Chris-
tian ethics. As Pruss observes, "[t]his argument does not prove that the 
requirement holds for everyone, but just that it holds for many and probably 
most" (CFB 292; emphasis added). If he is correct about this, it follows that 
Pojmanian faith will be insufficient for most people. 
Crucial to Pruss's reasoning here is the claim that many if not most peo-
ple who believe that the epistemic probability of Christianity is less than 
.50 assign epistemic probability of greater than .50 to ethical precepts that 
conflict with what they believe are Christian ethical precepts. Pruss sup-
ports this premise by identifying five issues on which people with merely 
Pojmanian faith are likely to hold ethical views that would conflict with 
what they believe are Christian ethical precepts: (1) the issue of whether 
a woman is ever obligated to have an abortion; (2) the issue of whether a 
person is ever obligated to intentionally kill an innocent person; (3) the is-
sue of whether a person is ever obligated to offer sacrifice to Caesar; (4) the 
issue of whether a person is obligated to stay at home from church with 
a spouse who has a mild illness; and (5) the issue of whether a person is 
obligated to work on Sunday when she could benefit from extra income.6 
As an empirical matter, it seems unlikely that any of these issues would 
bring the ethical commitments of a person assigning less than 50 percent 
likelihood to Christianity into conflict with what she believes are Christian 
ethical commitments. For starters, there are two problems with Pruss's 
view on issue (1) that a Pojmanian Christian is likely to "believe that if 
Christianity is true, then it is very likely impermissible to have an abor-
tion under any circumstances, and that if Christianity is false, then there 
very likely are circumstances in which an abortion is a duty" (CFB 293).7 
First, it ignores the fact that many Pojmanian Christians, like many non-
Christians and non-theists, oppose abortion rights because they believe 
that the fetus is a moral person from the moment of conception.s This is 
problematic because every non-religious argument for the conclusion that 
the fetus is a person is also available to someone with merely Pojmanian 
faith. Indeed, insofar as one can consistently believe that God does not 
exist and that human beings are a composite of souls and bodies, one can 
consistently oppose abortion rights on the ground that ensoulment, which 
is sufficient for personhood, occurs at conception. 
Second, it ignores the fact that many proponents of abortion rights be-
lieve that abortion always violates a moral obligation. While some abortion-
rights proponents may believe that early abortions involve no moral dis-
value whatsoever, that is not a mainstream position. If the philosophical 
literature is any indication, most abortion-rights proponents differ from 
abortion-rights opponents not in thinking that abortion is morally permis-
sible, but rather in thinking that, up to a certain point P in the pregnancy, 
the moral wrongness of abortion does not rise to the level of murder be-
cause the fetus is not a person until p'9 Thus, on this reasoning, while it 
may be true that abortion always violates a moral obligation, it should not 
be legally prohibited prior to the occurrence of P because the fetus is not a 
person with a right to life until P and hence cannot be murdered.10 As an 
empirical matter, there is little reason to think most Pojmanian Christians 
are likely to think that abortion is ever morally obligatory,u 
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Similar problems arise in connection with Pruss's analysis of issue 
(2). If my experience in teaching ethics is any indication, very few non-
Christians, non-theists, or Pojmanian Christians would take the position that 
it is sometimes morally obligatory to kill an innocent person. Though Pruss 
is correct that "any Christian who believes in the conditional claim 'Were 
Christianity false, [act] utilitarianism would be true' will surely find many 
examples of moral conflict between Christian ethics and non-Christian eth-
ics" (CFB 293),12 very few skeptics about theism or Christianity would char-
acterize themselves as act utilitarians. While my experience is admittedly 
anecdotal in character, I would estimate that fewer than 1 percent of my 
students continue to think act utilitarianism is plausible after considering 
the counterexamples that show that act utilitarianism implies that there are 
circumstances in which, say, an innocent person should be killed to harvest 
her organs to save the lives of more important peopleP 
There is little reason to think that most Pojmanian Christians would take 
the positions on issues (3), (4), and (5) that Pruss believes they would take. 
For example, it is unlikely that a Pojmanian Christian would think that is 
morally wrong, if Christianity is true, to offer sacrifice to Caesar to save in-
nocent persons. The Pojmanian Christian assigns an epistemic probability 
of less than .50 to Christianity, but profoundly hopes that Christianity is 
true. But it is hard to imagine that a skeptic about the truth of Christianity 
could coherently believe that it is morally obligatory to offer sacrifice to 
Caesar if needed to save innocent persons from torture, but profoundly 
hope that such a gesture is morally wrong-as would be required if such 
a person were to find themselves in a position to be in conflict with what 
she believes is required by Christianity on Pruss's view.14 
The problem is that Pruss simply assumes that the most likely views 
about what is required by Christianity are the traditional views. While it 
is true, of course, that many Christians endorse these traditional views, 
there are many Christians who take different positions on what Christi-
anity requires. If Pruss is correct in thinking that people with Pojmanian 
faith are likely to take somewhat less restrictive views on issues like (3), 
(4), and (5) (and I think he is), then it is reasonable to hypothesize that they 
are also likely to reject the traditional views that Christianity requires that 
one go to Church when one's spouse has a mild illness and that one not 
work on Sunday if not financially necessary-views likely to be shared 
by many reasonable Christians. IS For this reason, Pruss's argument falls 
short of showing that "many, if not most," people with Pojmanian faith are 
likely to find their ethical views in conflict with what they believe Chris-
tianity requires. 
It is probably true, of course, that some Pojmanian Christians will find 
themselves in exactly the dilemma that Pruss describes, but this weaker 
claim is not enough to ground anything that is plausibly characterized 
as a criticism of Pojman's view. As we saw, Pojman does not claim that 
Pojmanian faith is sufficient for authentic Christian faith; he claims only 
that propositional belief that God exists is not necessary for such faith and 
hence that it can be grounded in Pojmanian hope (if, say, other necessary 
conditions are satisfied). The fact that some people will experience such 
conflicts is simply not strong enough to raise any serious worries about 
Pojman's view that faith-as-profound-hope can play the same important 
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noetic roles that ordinary faith plays and is hence sufficient to achieve all 
the essential benefits of religion. 
While the empirical claim that most Pojmanian Christians will experi-
ence such conflicts is not, by itself, enough to refute Pojman's conception 
of faith, one might think that it raises a different kind of problem for Poj-
man's view. There are only so many additional necessary conditions that 
one can add to Pojmanian faith without giving rise to a situation in which 
it is plausible to think that someone who satisfies those necessary condi-
tions really does believe the central tenets of Christianity-though she may 
not actually realize this. At some point, it becomes difficult to distinguish 
the noetic states of someone who has faith and propositional belief from 
the noetic states of someone who has Pojmanian faith and satisfies all the 
other additional necessary conditions; after all, profound hope is also a 
component of ordinary faith that is grounded in propositional acceptance 
of the central tenets of Christianity. Pruss's argument that Pojmanian faith 
is insufficient in most, if not all, cases is enough to raise the worry that the 
bulk of what one would have to add to a Pojmanian conception to make it 
sufficient for authentic faith simply amounts to (possibly latent) proposi-
tional belief that the central tenets of Christianity are true. 
Pruss's analysis, however, is not sufficient to justify much concern 
about this worry because he does not make an adequate case for thinking 
most Pojmanian Christians will find themselves in perceived conflict with 
Christian ethics at some point. Here it is crucial to realize that these are 
empirical claims that ultimately require empirical argument of some kind 
and hence cannot be settled by the sort of armchair sociology employed 
by Pruss (and myself). While one can avoid detailed empirical analysis 
if the claims are pretty obviously plausible, the analysis I have offered in 
this section should suffice to show, at the very least, that Pruss's empirical 
views are far from obvious. 
In response, Pruss might argue that he doesn't need empirical argu-
ment because the mere fact that every Pojmanian Christian can conceive 
of finding themselves in such a dilemma is enough to show that they are 
not fully committed to doing what Christianity requires. 16 On this line of 
analysis, if the Pojmanian Christian carne to believe that it is likely that 
abortion is sometimes morally obligatory and that Christianity implies 
that abortion is always morally wrong, then she would be committed to 
acting in a way that is inconsistent with what she believes is required by 
Christianity. And that is enough to show that she is not fully Christian 
since being fully Christian being requires being committed to acting in 
accordance with Christian precepts in every conceivable set of circum-
stances she might face.17 
As a first step towards seeing why this argument fails, it is helpful to 
note that Christians who believe the central tenets of Christianity will 
never find themselves in such a position. Someone who believes that the 
central tenets of Christianity are true cannot even conceive of herself qua 
Christian in such conflicts because the central tenets guarantee that what 
is required by Christianity is ethically correct! The only wayan ordinary 
Christian could conceive of being in such a conflict is if she imagines that 
she no longer accepts those tenets. What thus explains why an ordinary 
Christian can't conceive of a situation in which she qua Christian finds 
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herself believing that it is likely that X is morally required while believing 
that the truth of Christianity implies that X is morally prohibited is that 
her beliefs that Christianity is true and that the truth of Christianity entails 
that X is morally prohibited logically preclude her from thinking that it is 
likely that X is morally required. 
But it is reasonable to hypothesize that Pojmanian Christians will also 
have beliefs that logically preclude finding themselves in such conflicts. A 
strong felt desire for an afterlife that would redeem the injustice and suf-
fering in the world will be enough to ground a profound hope that some 
form of theism is true, but it is not enough to ground a profound hope that 
any particular religious tradition is true. It is reasonable to hypothesize 
that, in ordinary cases, a Pojmanian theist must see, at the very least, ethi-
cal truth in Christianity in order to have a profound hope for the truth of 
Christianity. 
For example, the fact that I see so much that is morally repugnant in 
certain fundamentalist interpretations of Islam is enough to preclude me, 
as a logical matter, from ever hoping that these fundamentalist interpre-
tations are true. Indeed, while I continue to struggle with various tenets 
of Christianity and sometimes even with theism itself, I never doubt the 
ethical precept that one should love one's neighbor as oneself-which is 
the foundation of Christian ethics.18 Though I doubt the inferences that 
more conservative Christians make from this principle, it represents a fun-
dament of my belief structure. My abiding commitment to this principle 
logically precludes me from ever finding myself in the conflict-situation 
that Pruss describes-and would do so even if my doubts about theism 
reached a point where all that was left in me was a profound hope that 
theism was true. 
To the extent, then, that a Pojmanian Christian is drawn to hope for the 
truth of Christianity (instead of other religions) because she believes that 
it uniquely gets the ethics right, her ethical beliefs logically preclude that 
she will find herself in the conflict situation described by Pruss. Of course, 
what percentage of Pojmanian Christians are drawn to Christianity by 
such beliefs is an empirical matter that must ultimately be settled by more 
rigorous empirical argument than is offered by either Pruss or me. But it 
is certainly more plausible to hypothesize, at first blush, that most Pojma-
nian Christians will hope for Christianity's truth on the strength of conver-
gent ethical commitments than that they will hope for Christianity's truth 
despite believing that the fundaments of Christian ethics are likely to be 
false. While such a state of mind may not be logically incoherent, it would 
be phenomenologically very difficult to bring about. 
III. The Problem with Mep 
Central to Pruss's argument is the claim that MCP is a principle of morality 
that defines "real, albeit subjective, moral obligations" (CFB 295; emphasis 
added). According to Pruss, we do not always know what our objective 
obligations (i.e., obligations that are independent of what we think they 
are) require of us. In such circumstances, MCP requires that we act in ac-
cordance with our best judgment of what our objective moral obligations 
require: "if after sufficiently thorough examination one comes to believe 
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that something is immoral, then one has a real, albeit subjective, moral 
obligation to shun it" (CFB 295; emphasis added). It bears reiterating here 
that MCP does not merely define an epistemic obligation; as Pruss formu-
lates the distinction, MCP defines a genuine moral obligation that is like 
any other: "One does wrong if one ignores this real subjective obligation" 
(CFB 295; emphasis added). 
While Pruss believes that it would be "difficult to dispute" that MCP 
is a moral principle, MCP is the subject of considerable disagreement. 
For example, Kurt Baier argues that we are tempted to think MCP is a 
moral principle only because we are misusing language; once we accu-
rately describe acts that are based on erroneous beliefs, the motivation for 
thinking that our real obligations are the subjective ones and hence that 
MCP expresses a moral principle disappears.19 Indeed, W. D. Ross, who is 
widely credited with having discovered the distinction and the underly-
ing worry, flip-flopped on the issue. Ross took the position in The Right and 
the Good that we are always obligated to do what is objectively right,20 but 
came to believe in Foundations of Ethics that we are sometimes obligated 
only to do what is subjectively right.21 Contra Pruss, the issue remains far 
from settled. 
It is easy to see the intuitive appeal of MCP. After all, we are creatures 
of limited intellectual ability who inevitably, despite our best and most 
conscientious efforts, get our objective obligations wrong. No matter how 
diligent we might be in attempting to predict the consequences of our be-
haviors, we will sometimes make morally significant mistakes because the 
consequences of our behavior are not subject to our precise control and 
are hence difficult to predict. Because we are limited in this way, there are 
some cases of subjective error that are not plausibly characterized as cul-
pable: if, for example, a seemingly innocuous act unforeseeably results in 
the death of an innocent person, it seems unfair to hold the agent account-
able. On this line of analysis, an agent who satisfies her subjective duty 
under MCP has done all that morality can require of her. 
The problem is that MCP is well known to be vulnerable to counterex-
amples. Consider, for example, the chilling reasoning of someone who be-
lieves that he has a religiously-based moral duty to save persons by killing 
abortion doctors.22 Such a person believes (and hence assigns epistemic 
probability of greater than 50 percent to) the claims that (1) he has a duty 
to use deadly force when necessary to save the lives of a large number of 
innocent persons from a morally wrongful threat; (2) this duty is owed 
both to God and to those persons whose lives might be endangered by 
such a threat; (3) the fetus is a person from the moment of conception; (4) 
fetuses are innocent; (5) abortion is a morally wrongful threat to the lives 
of fetuses; and (6) using deadly force against an abortion doctor is the 
only way to save the lives of innocent fetuses. Claims (1) through (6), on 
this line of reasoning, seem to imply that one has a moral obligation to use 
deadly force against an abortion provider. Thus, such a person believes 
that his system of religious ethics commits him to the claim that killing an 
abortion provider is morally obligatory. 
It is hard to imagine that someone could fail to be aware that this last 
claim conflicts with moral judgments entailed by other systems held by 
people in the culture. Presumably, such a person also believes that other 
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systems of ethics assert that it would be morally impermissible to kill an 
abortion doctor because the fetus does not become a person until much 
later in the pregnancy. Of course, someone who kills an abortion doctor 
would likely deny that such systems are anything more than putatively 
ethical; indeed, he might hold that the epistemic probability of such views 
is so low that it is morally wrong even to hold them. Thus, the killer of an 
abortion provider believes, in addition to claims (1) through (6) above, the 
claims that: (7) his religious ethics conflicts with other systems of ethics; 
and (8) the epistemic probability of his religious ethics is much higher 
than the epistemic probability of these other systems (though he probably 
would not express his belief in such language). 
Presumably, if he thought about it, he would also come to believe that 
the moral weight assigned by his religious ethics to the obligatoriness of 
killing an abortion provider is at least as great as the moral weight as-
signed by these other systems to the impermissibility of killing an abor-
tion provider; after all, it is the right to life of innocent persons that he 
believes is at stake in both judgments. Moreover, he would likely reason 
that his religious ethics assigns a greater moral weight to the obligatori-
ness of killing an abortion doctor than the non-religious systems assign 
to the impermissibility of doing so because there are more innocent lives 
involved in the former (i.e., the lives of the many fetuses) than in the latter 
(i.e., the life of just the abortion doctor). 
All the antecedent conditions of MCP are thus realized: the killer be-
lieves that (i) one body, A, of moral claims (i.e., his religious ethics) implies 
that an action cp (Le., refraining from killing an abortion provider) is im-
permissible and another body, B (i.e., some preferred non-religious system 
of ethics), implies that it is obligatory; (ii) the moral weight assigned by 
A to the impermissibility of refraining from killing an abortion provider 
is at least as great as that which B assigns to the obligatoriness of refrain-
ing from killing an abortion provider; (iii) no other body of moral claims 
is a serious contender in one's epistemic predicament; and (iv) A is more 
probable than B. It follows, then, according to MCP that the killer is mor-
ally prohibited from refraining from killing the abortion doctor. Otherwise 
put, it follows, under MCp, that the killer is morally obligated to kill the 
abortion doctor. 
Here is another all-tao-unfortunate counterexample from real life. An-
drea Yates drowned her five children in a bathtub on the strength of the 
following beliefs: (1) the only way that she could save her children from an 
eternity of suffering in hell was to kill them; (2) one has a moral obligation 
to kill innocent persons if this is the only way to save them from an eternity 
of suffering in hell; (3) there are other systems of presumably non-religious 
ethics that hold that it is always impermissible to kill innocent children; 
and (4) her system of ethics is more likely to be true than any other system. 
Moreover, I imagine that Yates would have arrived at the conclusion, had 
she thought about it, that the weight assigned by her religious ethics to the 
obligation to kill her children to save them from hell is at least as great as 
the weight assigned by the other systems to the impermissibility of killing 
her children; after all, one can reason in Pascalian fashion that the finite 
loss associated with the loss of earthly life is infinitesimal compared with 
the loss associated with an eternity of infinite suffering in hell. Once again, 
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the antecedent conditions of MCP are straightforwardly satisfied, which 
entails that Yates was morally obligated to kill her children.23 
It gets much worse for MCP. Our history includes many instances of 
evil acts performed under the mistaken belief that they were morally 
obligatory. Racists of every kind, for example, typically justify their rep-
rehensible views and behaviors on the strength of some alleged moral 
principle that implies the culpable inferiority of the relevant race. Indeed, 
Hitler's horrific pogrom was grounded in what he took to be a moral vi-
sion of racist purity that required the extermination of Jews. As H. J. Mc-
Closkey observes, "we do not need to consider the beliefs of primitive 
peoples to discover examples of gravely erroneous moral views [because 
c]ontemporary Western society provides examples enough."24 If MCP is 
a moral principle, then these straightforwardly reprehensible acts are all 
morally obligatory-an obviously unacceptable result.2S 
The problem arises here for Pruss's argument precisely because it relies 
on the claim that MCP defines "real" obligations. Given that "[o]ne does 
wrong if one ignores [one's] real subjective obligation[ s]" (CFB 295; empha-
sis added), our subjective obligations, if such there be, are every bit as real 
as our objective obligations. Indeed, on this view, MCP is quite plausibly 
characterized as defining an objective obligation to do what we subjectively 
believe is more likely to be right when faced with a conflict of principles. 
As the debate is traditionally framed, the issue is whether our real obliga-
tions in such cases is defined by what is actually right or what we believe 
is right. 
At the very least, these examples call into question the claim that MCP 
states an uncontroversial moral principle. It is hard to say exactly why 
MCP goes wrong, but it seems plausible to think that there are moral prin-
ciples that require that people form moral judgments that, other things 
being equal, are reasonable given the available evidence. What makes the 
mere acceptance of a racist view (even if one never acts on it) morally 
wrong has to do in part, of course, with the obvious iniquity of the view; 
but it also has something to do with the fact that one must deliberately 
overlook all sorts of clear and compelling evidence to continue to hold the 
position, which underlies most racist views, that members of some race in-
stantiate some unique property that negates their having moral standing. 
Such willful blindness is, it is reasonable to surmise, morally problematic 
in any instance in which it might result in behaviors that cause substantial 
harm to other persons. 
Something like this helps to explain why we are inclined to condemn 
Andrea Yates, assuming she is sufficiently rational to be held accountable 
for her behavior, despite the fact that we can see how someone who held 
her beliefs would arrive at the awful conclusion at which she arrived. 
The problematic claim, of course, was her view that the only way to save 
her children from an eternity of suffering in hell is to kill them. Not only 
is there nothing that remotely resembles evidence for such a claim; this 
claim is inconsistent with every Christian theology that is even remotely 
in play among mainstream Christians. Indeed, it is the claim's utter lack 
of connection with anything that could even be remotely characterized 
as evidence that leads one to suspect that she is not rational (perhaps she 
heard voices). 
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Similarly, part of what makes the behavior of someone who murders 
an abortion provider reprehensible is that he took a person's life on the 
strength of a highly contestable claim-namely, the claim that the fetus 
is a person from the moment of conception. The principles governing the 
defense of self and others usually require that it be reasonable to think 
that deadly force is necessary to save the lives of innocent persons. But 
there is considerable uncertainty among Christians and non-Christians 
alike about when the fetus is a person from the moment of conception; 
indeed, the claim that the fetus is a person from the moment of concep-
tion has achieved ascendancy among Christians only comparatively re-
cently.26 While one can reasonably apprehend that deadly force is neces-
sary to save the lives of the fetus, it is not reasonable to apprehend that 
the threat is to a person given so much disagreement about when person-
hood begins. Thus, the principle of self-defense lacks plausible applica-
tion in this case. 
Indeed, the situation is considerably worse: killing an abortion doctor 
not only can't be justified by reference to the principle of self-defense, but 
also violates an obvious moral principle that justifies holding the killer ac-
countable for murder. Given the uncertainty about when fetuses become 
moral persons, it is morally reprehensible to end the life of someone who 
is known to be a moral person in defense of something that is not known 
to be a moral person. And this, it is reasonable to think, is something that 
moral agents are morally obligated to understand. Indeed, the kind of 
epistemic mistake made by the killer of an abortion doctor is a moral mis-
calculation that is egregious enough to justify subjecting him to prosecu-
tion for murder. 
In any event, while something like MCP may help us to understand 
why people like Yates and murderers of abortion doctor commit the ter-
rible acts they do, it cannot justify those acts. Viewed internally, their be-
havior is grounded in reasoning that appears to be logically rational. MCP 
thus helps us to recognize their behavior as falling within the realm of 
rational calculation: such persons validly (but not soundly) reasoned that 
they were morally obligated to behave this way given their initial moral 
commitments. But the mere fact that one can construct a valid rational ar-
gument from normative premises to a specific recommendation for action, 
by itself, does not suffice to morally justify that behavior. If the foregoing 
analysis is correct, we have moral responsibilities to have certain moral 
beliefs. But even if it is not correct, the preceding counterexamples show 
that, as stated, MCP is clearly false as a principle of morality. Contra Pruss, 
MCP does not appear to define "real, albeit subjective, obligations" that 
would be "wrong to ignore." 
One might reasonably think that Pruss does not need a principle as 
strong as MCP to make a case against Pojman's views on faith. On this line 
of analysis, Pruss could simply respond by reformulating MCP to state a 
principle that describes what an agent is committed (as opposed to morally 
obligated to do); according to this formulation of the principle, an agent 
is committed to doing what she believes is entailed by the ethical views 
most likely to be true. Accordingly, a Pojmanian Christian who has ethi-
cal views that conflict with the ethical views she believes are entailed by 
Christianity is committed, on this principle, to doing what is inconsistent 
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with what she believes is required by Christianity. Thus, insofar as being 
fully Christian requires that one be committed to doing what one believes 
is required by Christianity, a Pojmanian Christian with conflicting ethical 
views cannot be fully ChristianY 
There are three possible interpretations of the reformulated principle, 
and none are successful in establishing the desired conclusion. First, if 
"committed" refers to what the agent is morally committed to do (i.e., 
committed by morality to doing), then the revised version of the prin-
ciple is vulnerable to the same counterexamples that cause problems for 
MCP. Second, if "committed" refers to the agent's own mental states and 
intentions, then it seems pretty clearly false. It seems clear, as a psycho-
logical matter, that a Pojmanian Christian can commit herself to acting in 
accordance with what she believes is required by Christian ethics even in 
instances in which her beliefs about what is right according to Christian 
ethics are inconsistent with her beliefs about what is right. Third, if "com-
mitted" refers to what the agent is logically committed to doing, then the 
principle is true but irrelevant. There is little reason to believe that being 
fully Christian requires that one be logically committed to doing what 
Christianity requires; it seems reasonable to think that it is enough that 
one is psychologically or personally committed to doing what Christian-
ity requires. 28 
In this essay, I have criticized Pruss's argument that Pojmanian faith is 
rarely, if ever, sufficient for authentic Christian faith. First, I have argued 
that Pruss significantly overstates the likelihood in a Pojmanian Chris-
tian of a conflict between her ethical precepts and what she thinks are 
Christian ethical precepts. Second, I have argued that MCP is not plausi-
bly thought of as defining real moral obligations. Thus, if these arguments 
are sound, then both of the two central claims on which Pruss's argument 
relies are false. 
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5. I consider below the claim that the mere possibility of finding oneself 
in such a conflict is sufficient to logically preclude being fully Christian. See 
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17. After all, the mere fact that I get through this life without stealing any-
fhing, by itself, doesn't show that I am fully committed to the rule that prohib-
its stealing; it might be that what explains the fact that I never stole anything 
is that I never encountered anything I really coveted enough to steal. What 
determines whether I am fully committed to the rule is how I would respond 
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